A systemic bias in ecosystem valuation

After readings a few articles written by Dr Spash (who interviewed me last week) and some others, I get a couple of new thoughts on environmental valuation.

There is a systemic bias in traditional environmental valuation techniques, to whcih Dr Spash named as 'deontological bias'. When applying valuation techniques like Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), economists would usually classify zero bids or 'unrealistic' bids as protest bids and eliminate these from the average and aggreate WTP figures. But some protest-bidders might hold strong rights-based beliefs. They thought that any components of the nature have an inviolable right to exist and need to be protected whatever the costs. They were not irrational but simply did not believe that the monetary estimates could represent their unlimited 'values' attached to particular environmental products or goods. Under the current mechanisms this kind of responses is not counted. Consequently the WTP figures are biased to utilitarians who do have a 'value' in their minds.

The importance of such an utilitarian-deontological distinction lies on the ways 'values' are defined in current value system. Common economics beleifs suggest market prices represent the utility levels obtained by buying that good or service. By utility it does not actually imply whether that good or service exhibit certain actual 'functions' or not; it may refer to non-use preferences. Most economists do not reject this view. While prices represent an array of preferences of an individual, does it include deontological beliefs? Is it really presenting the whole picture?

Can prices, or valuation techniques like CVM, measure a 'price' I may impose on something to which I reject such a measuring practice? Put simply, I think my daughter or son is priceless, does it make sense if you ask me for a price? It is, however, still a problem if you deny the existence of an implicit value for that environmetnal good or services, given that, in philosophical sense, 'value' per se means the whole array of preferences, be it utilitarian or deonological. Exclusion of which is an ignorance of reality.

This draws many problems about how to incorporate these implicit beliefs into policy-making. The first one is, do we still need a value? I think the answer is 'yes', but we need to think seriously whether valuation should be treated as an end itself, or alternatively, a means to an end. Second, how can we precisely measure rights-based beliefs? Maybe by Deliberative Monetary Valuation (DMV) that Dr Spash is working on, probably including me as well if I am luckily accepted for the PhD studentship.

P.S. Now I understand why someone said every academic discipline, at the end, is a branch of philosophy. And that's why research doctoral degree is called 'Doctor of Philosophy' (PhD). It seems to me that sustainability is more like a philosophical quest.