『科學非萬能』

有point, 所以當我看完胡適的一本談科學的書之後, 就覺得不必看下去, 因為他誇大了科學的作用, 迷信科學的客觀性, 他還曾說大自然是人類最大敵人要克服之, 民初文人的天真可見一斑。


思考有方﹕科學非萬能 勿盲目迷信
(明報)2010年11月25日 星期四 05:05
【明報專訊】「通識教育科」的「科學、科技與環境」學習範圍，提到科學化、科學證據、科學知識、科學精神和科學方法等名詞和概念，貫串在課程內容當中，到底什麼是「科學方法」？
教科書關於科學方法的標準描述，包括下列幾個步驟，同學都耳熟能詳﹕

“1.界定問題﹕
從觀察中發現問題，並清楚界定問題
2.提出假設﹕
就觀察的結果，作出初步的解釋和假設
3.推斷預測﹕
由假設推出觀察性的預測
4.實驗驗證﹕
設計和運用實驗去檢視假設和預測是否正確
5.作出結論﹕
分析結果，作出結論。如果所得的實驗觀察結果不符合假設和預測，需要重新實驗或提出新的假設。”
大瞻假設 小心求證
上述這套所謂「科學方法」，稱之為「實驗方法」更為準確，而「實驗方法」只是多樣的科學方法之一。「實驗方法」無疑標誌著科學發展史上的轉折點，但就是現代自然科學的成就，很多並不利用「實驗方法」直接證明。宇宙天體的體積重量太大，人類無法改變它們的運行軌迹；微觀世界的基本粒子，我們難以準確掌握它們的位置和速度；地質考古的理論和假設，科學家不可能重複一個以億萬年為時間單位的演變過程等等，都是難以通過實驗去「證明」的例子。
另一方面，即使今天能夠在實驗室裏做實驗，與其說是「證明」了某一理論或假設，倒不如說是做了一次「測試」，今天的實驗結果，科學家無法確認可以在將來每次都能重複。
假如上述實驗方法「五部曲」只是眾多科學方法之一，科學方法又是什麼？用胡適的話說﹕「科學的方法，說來其實很簡單，只不過『尊重事實，尊重證據。』在應用上，科學的方法只不過『大膽的假設，小心的求證』。」。又說﹕「科學態度在於撇開成見，擱起感情，只認得事實，只跟證據走。」不同學科的科學方法，例如天文學方法、量子力學方法、地質學方法等，並不局限於實驗證明而更為多姿多彩。套用美國 教育哲學家杜威（John Dewey）的說話﹕「科學是認識的不斷完善。」（Science is the perfecting of knowing.），科學方法強調不斷求真。 科學方法並不能解决所有問題，有它的適用範圍和局限。例如，科學方法可以告訴我們火力發電和核能發電的碳排放量的差別，也可以幫助研究開發發電技術，但卻無法回答到底哪種發電方式更適合香港的可持續發展，因後者是價值取向問題，科學方法可以提供有助討論的答案，卻並不能回答怎樣才算適合香港可持續發展。
科學方法亦不一定比其他方法優越，用科學方法分析李白杜甫優美的詩篇，結果可能只是一大堆無用數字，並非所有有價值的事物都與科學方法兼容，也沒有必要事事訴諸科學，製造迷信。
（系列十五之八）
文﹕張偉基

Economics in diversity

'Decoupling the concept of monetary values from economic monism must be complemented by correspondingly decoupling the norms of value articulation from the established value hierarchy whose viability is causally interdependent on the elicited values. Logically it is impossible to include all types of values; a more fruitful way of thinking is to repudiate institution that would exclude any. To paraphrase Samuel Tilden (cited in Dewey, 1954), the means by which a hierarchy comes to be a hierarchy is the more important thing. The monistic economic value is sustained by, and in turn sustains, the monistic structure of economics. Merely diversifying the ends to be pursued is not sufficient to addressing value pluralism. '

This is a paragraph in my literature review. The idea is theoretically oriented and complex. This is the central theme of my thesis, which embodies the notion of 'economics in diversity'. I have a feeling that this is a quite important concept to dealing with our current challenge, that is, ecological limits, risks, and uncertainties, and all associated social impacts. The linkage is not very clear to me at the moment. But I think the 'targets' of the sustainability movement are beyond science and human's selfishness. The core issues, in fact, revolve around ethical diversity.

Maybe I can write this up as a book some day??!

How many economists does it take to change a lightbulb?

How many economists does it take to change a lightbulb?

Two: One to change the bulb and one to assume the existence of a ladder.
Eight: One to screw in the light bulb and seven to hold everything else constant.
None: They are all waiting for the invisible hand.

Alcon and Solarz: 'The Autistic Economist'
Yale Economic Review, Summer 2006

Read two theoretical writings

本來這個月是用來閉關苦讀，可以種種事情令我不能集中，總覺得不在狀態

不過，在過去的三個星期也能夠把兩本對我的工作比較重要著作看過大半，我的目的很明確：在開始研究之前要先把其理論脈絡用清楚，不然無法知道所得的結果在學術上有何意義，更無法從根本地解答當前問題。


第一本是John O'Neill 的"Market, Deliberation and Environment" (Routledge, 2007)
雖然這本書的內容都十分有趣而且重要，但大都已經被其他人及作者自己在其他articles討論過，這本書似乎是作者自己的論文總結，沒什麼創新觀點。主要是圍繞經濟價值的謬誤，及deliberative democracy的優劣。當中有一點是值得深思，有些人 - 包括Clive和我 - 都主張用deliberative institution去articulate 環境價值，即是透過半公開、實驗形式的小組討論去為某一環境物品定價，然而O'Neill卻似乎反對一切定價行為，他所提出的論據不無道理，例如很多公共財產都有道德價值，根本不適宜被冠上幣值。但我在想是不是一定是all or nothing，到底問題是出在幣值本身，還是它背後理論假設及運作模式? 是否可以將後二者來點改變，然後重新定義環境價值(monetary)? 有沒有中間路線呢?



第二本是我supervisor，另一位John，John Dryzek的"Discursive Democract" (Cambridge, 1990)
此書為該領域的奠基著作之一，它提出了一套新的民主理論，此一理論即為上文提及的deliberative institution 的基礎。大意是公共決策該由collective, public communication而始，而非individualistic, aggregative voting，再簡單點說就是talk before vote，視public dialogue為最主要的決策原素，而非次於majority voting。另一個重要觀點是(inter)subjectivism取代objectivism，就是說在政策層面上，科學化、重結果的reasoning不應被用作處理公共資源的絕對準則，這兩者都或多或多了假設了某種特定的價值觀，例如經濟學裡的『效率』，取而代之的是communicative rationality，其主要主張為: the only authority is better arguments (not material gains)。這套理論最大優點是容納多元價值，但我仍是沒法從中找到適當的理論途徑去解讀從deliberative institution所產生的monetary value，即是以group的形式、經過商議及專家討論後所同意的willingness-to-pay是代表著什麼? (WTP in market is price, which is easy to understand)。另外deliberative institution又是否exclusive of strategic reasoning? 但別忘記有時候strategic reasoning也是多元價值的表達形式之一。

在我的研究領域內，提出、測試及解釋可容納多元價值的制度是一個新方向，但多元價值卻與傳統經濟系統合不來，要經濟利益老是屈於其他價值之下也不合民主原則，且是難於實行，用一套independent-of-all的approach i.e. communicative rationalization似乎比較合理，但如何可以做到? 如何解讀?

Neverheless, I can see there is one possible way to interpret. It stems from the theory of communicative action by Jurgen Habermas, the leading philosophy in 20th century (from which Dryzek and others developed the idea of deliberative democracy). Communicative rationality is that it is tied to subject-subject relation between interacting individuals, rather than subject-object relation between monologically acting individuals presumed by instrument rationality underpinning economics. So, value from deliberative institutions should be understood as a matter of intersubjectivity, not exclusively objectivity nor subjectivity. It is the interaction among people as a group that forms the value, not isolated individuals; not uncontested economic nor ethical interests, but the interplay between them.

Environmental behaviour

Read an insightful article wriiten by Paul Stern, a renowned environmental psychologist. It is about the what factors determine intended environmental behaviours. Here I summarize the key points.

First, there are four (or three) main types of environmental behaviours:
1. Environmental activism, e.g. active involvement in environmental organizations and demonstrations;

2. Public-sphere non-activism -
(a), Environmental citizenship, e.g. petitioning on environmental issues, joining environmental organizations;
(b), Policy support or acceptance, stated approval of environmental regulations, willingness to pay higher taxes for environmental protection

3. Private-sphere environmentalism, e.g. purchase of environmentally friendly products, green comsumerism.

Four types of causal variables influencing these behaviours are proposed:
1. Attitudinal, e.g. general and specific environmental beliefs, personal norms, perceived costs and benefits of the action

2. Personal capabilities, e.g. social status, income, specific skills

3. Contextual factors, e.g. laws and regulations, social norms and expectations, supporting policies

4. Habit and routine


The author notes that different causal variables appear to work different ways in influencing behaviours. For costly, complex and difficult environmental decisions (e.g. reducing automobile use in suburb), personal capabilities and contextual factors are more important. For those 'easy' behaviours (e.g. reducing the use of papers), attitudinal factors play major role.


Two points to note.
Firstly, the bases of private- and public-sphere environmental behaviours are different. To me, it means that my WTP (willingness-to-pay) for organic foods runs in a different mental track from paying an ecotax to support organic farming - one is about personal consumption while the other a social committment. (so, some people may say they support a government environmental policy but in fact do not personally behave green. This reflects there are different combinations of causal factors in action).
Secondly, contextual factors have to be considered (many previous studies have ignored). These involve broader social, economic and political contexts surrounding specific environmental issues. As far as climate change is concerned, personal attitudinal factors are but one of the determinants of people's intended contributions, which may also be affected by existing policy constraints and attitude, perceived reliability of scientific reports, and social trust.

Extended reading: Paul C. Stern (2000), Toward a coherent theory of environmentally significant behavior, Journal of Social Issues, 56 (3), pp. 407-424

Free market and Nobel Prize

It's time to change.


「金融海嘯勢顛覆諾獎評選」 經濟災難元兇 矛頭直指佛利民
(明報)10月6日 星期一 05:05

【明報專訊】一年一度的諾貝爾獎 將於今天開始公布。當前金融海嘯了令全球經濟陷危，也令諾貝爾經濟學獎過去長期褒揚自由主義經濟學派的角色受質疑。不少評論都將金融海嘯歸咎於佛利民和「芝加哥學派」等鼓吹的美式自由主義經濟模式，2001年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主施蒂格利茨近日接受法新社訪問，便指出諾獎評審過去厚愛芝加哥學派，但今次金融海嘯將令諾貝爾經濟學獎的取向徹底改變。

在2001年贏得諾貝爾經濟學獎的哥倫比亞大學教授施蒂格利茨（Joseph Stiglitz）向法新社說﹕「我想當前的危機，正為經濟學帶來一場根本性的哲學理念轉變。我們看到不受管束的市場可以是一場災難。」

自1969年創立以來，諾貝爾經濟學獎曾頒給各個不同範疇從事研究的經濟學家，除宏觀及微觀經濟學外，還有部分得獎研究是涉及政治學以至心理學，但經濟學獎評審委員會一直都被批評太厚愛「新古典經濟學」。「新古典經濟學」鼓吹自由主義市場、主張放寬管制（deregulation），向獲華府建制推崇，成為當今主宰世界經濟的思想主流。

奪獎常客「芝加哥學派」恐失勢

但愈來愈多人指出，促成今時今日經濟災難的，正正是佛利民（Milton Friedman）這些鼓吹自由主義市場的經濟學獎得主的理論。佛利民於1976年獲得諾獎，他跟「芝加哥學派」（Chicago School）的經濟理念，掀起了一場右派經濟政策革命，不僅催生了列根和戴卓爾的經濟革命，連拉丁美洲、東歐和亞洲，都在不同階段或自願或被迫地了採納其主張。

批評者指出，這些自由派經濟學家堅信私人企業的決策最有效率、市場永遠是理性、政府不應插手干預及規管，這樣經濟就能以最佳狀態運作，但這些經濟學理論顯然要為今天的金融災難所負責。曾狠批世銀政策、導致2000年離任的世銀前首席經濟師施蒂格利茨說﹕「最近發生的連串事件，無疑提供了關鍵的實證，印證讓市場自行運作，情况並非那麼好。」

近半經濟學獎得主與芝大有關

在58位贏得諾貝爾獎的經濟學家中，有40位（即69%）是美國 人，當中來自芝加哥大學的「芝加哥學派」，得獎者特別多，至少有25位經濟學獎得主都跟芝大有關係。施氏說﹕「曾幾何時大家都流傳着這個笑話，就是說芝加哥和斯德哥爾摩之間有一列快車直達。」諾貝爾經濟學獎，是在瑞典 首都斯德哥爾摩頒發的。

隨着各國都為對抗金融海嘯而手忙腳亂，施氏和一些經濟學家都相信，未來經濟獎評審將不會再繼續將焦點放在放任自由主義上。經濟學家舍霍盧姆說﹕「這次的金融危機可令市場全面倒退……我不能相信這不會影響諾貝爾獎。」

學者料轉投混沌理論宏觀經濟學

瑞典SEB銀行首席分析師弗里森亦說﹕「現時仍有一些這範疇（新古典自由主義經濟學）的有趣研究，但無可避免地（人們會對這套學說）出現反彈……我認為這會令一些新研究範疇也有機會問鼎。」

弗里森指出，人們將對宏觀經濟學上穩定市場的部分重燃興趣，並更專注於混沌理論，以及像有關「信貸市場和社會經濟的互動關係」等的研究。施蒂格利茨亦說，他預期諾獎會走出以往的舊路，轉向生態經濟學等新領域。

法新社

Economic rationality?

To those who believed in economic assumptions and Form 5/7 economics textbook theories. Let's listen to psychologists.


「市場理性」經濟假設遭質疑
(明報)9月20日 星期六 05:10
【明報專訊】經濟學理論的基本假設之一是，投資者基於理性而作出投資行為。但華爾街金融海嘯引發的全球股災，卻令「市場理性」的假設受到挑戰和質疑。有學者便認為，資產泡沫的形成和爆破，一大驅動力就是投資者的非理性，諸如羊群心理甚至狂躁荷爾蒙等因素。

狂躁荷爾蒙「放大」市場波幅

「經濟學理論常認為，市場價格的形成，取決於人們的理性及信息完全。」英國 心理學家塔克特說，「這是完全錯誤的，操作市場的是人，而基於人意識的決定通常是膚淺的。」行為學專家安德烈森直指，部分非理性投資行為是羊群心態所致：一開始，人們不敢輕易入市，但看到鄰居或同事買股票賺到錢，他們也開始小心入市，並從不斷上漲的股價而獲得信心。伴隨收益增多，他們愈加得意忘形；當市場泡沫開始破裂時，投資者仍覺得無所謂，直到股價大瀉，沽盤增多，他們就開始恐慌性拋售。安德烈森說：「受他人影響，許多人開始短期投機，只看股票表面價格，忽視內在價值。」

劍橋 大學行為學專家科茨更認為，市場波動幅度被狂躁荷爾蒙放大。科茨曾在高盛和德銀工作，2000年科網股熱潮時，他驚見男交易員表現出「典型症狀的躁狂症」，即認為自己無所不能、想法狂熱和減少睡眠。科茨於是展開研究，從倫敦 證交所隨機選了17名男交易員，每天兩次提取他們的唾液樣本，分析兩種荷爾蒙的變化。一種是與男性侵略行為和性行為有關的睾丸素，另一種是皮質醇，即會指示身體如何應付危急環境（選擇戰鬥下去或走為上着）的反應，結果發現當交易員賺錢時，睾丸素就會上升，但損手或市場波動時，皮質醇會急劇增加。不少針對動物的研究已顯示，長遠來說，荷爾蒙偏高會損害判斷力，並激發冒險行為。

就連熟諳金融市場規則的投行高層也未必理性。去年，塔克特曾訪查全球數十位投行基金經理，發現他們在面對必須交出成績的巨大壓力下，常傾向無視風險因素，並不斷說服自己正掌握着別人並不知曉的關鍵。塔克特說：「儘管很多人說知道牛市不可能永遠持續下去，他們還是繼續冒險。」

法新社

Monthly quote

quoted from Mark Sagoff's book (The Economy of the Earth, 2nd ed., 2008)

"as societies rise above the poverty level, goods are valued more for their social or cultural meaning than for their use; this meaning, moreover, is largely determined by their distribution" (p.76)

Distribution here means inter- and intra-generational equity. It also refers to the changees in status or identity after a redistribution of the good, like ownership of a rare product e.g. 'I'm not a plastic bag!'. So, one is altruistic and the other is self-interest, but both of them may be different from the 'utility' as economists defined. It is more likely related to the act itself, rather than the utility gains from the act. That's means that when societies pass through a certain threshold, the meanings of value change, and the old ways of interpretation fail.

Maths-based environmental economics

This is a reply to someone in discussion forum who insisted that mathematics is very important if not central to economics and social science in general. I don't agree especially on the latter. Their academic mindsets are just too closed to be realistic. They forget the nature and purpose of economics as a social science, and just do maths for maths.

Link: http://www11.discuss.com.hk/viewthread.php?tid=7587344&extra=page%3D1&page=4

Env econ has a purpose of informing policy. Researchers commonly make use of many maths modelling and technical appraoches, like a 'must' in every publication. However, some people, including trained economists, considered this as source of problems rather than an advantage now (it's 'common' but flawed). They criticized the highly focused appraoch with maths has 'reduces the env problems to narrow technical issues and deliberately excludes a range of potential options and an interdisciplinary approch'.
For example, maths-based econ can hardly measure cultural-ethical value as it is non-marketed, slippery & not quite consistent to utilitartian theory. When assessing the value of fengshui forest 風水林, resource economists tend to look at productivity only, like the market value of timber and land which are measurable and more reliable (so, 'economically justifiable') and can be well fitted into maths-based techniques like CBA (cost-benefit analysis). However, this simply bypass those values (sort of cultural, 'religious' dimensions, like so called 龍脈, 風水山墳) that the local villages do care. Applying this econ etimate to project evaluation without taking such considerations may simply create conflict and may therefore be rejected by locals, green groups, and sometimes the government themselves. The equation looks good, but the number or symbol is narrowly defined given the nature of the issue.

Likewise, someone in World bank said it is economically justified to transfer all electronic waste to Africa. I suppose he can a make maths equation to show that this is efficient from econ perspective. However, you can imagine the justice and politics issue here. It is difficult to incorporate those value dimensions and issues that cannot be easily be precisely transferred as numbers in maths model, as I hv mentioned in my first post. If we strictly follow maths rules and stick to maths model as a policy basis, the result will be excluding some real-world issues that are really important to policy makers. This is the problem with hedonic pricing method, contingent valuation method (for valuing non-marketed goods) commonly used in env econ. The same problem applies to the Arctic energy resource, justice, politics,...and the list goes on. It is difficult to put these into equations - will u ask someone how much is your ethical belief?. Excluding these dimensions is a tradition of econ, but is a problem as well when the social aspirations change thru these years. That's why a renowned env economist said that env econ did not pay a key policy role - the maths-based, technical approaches are just too unrealistic to apply in real policy implementation. This view is supported by quite a number of economists in the field.

The flaw of the math-based env econ is then clear. By sticking to the orthrodox model they ignore those outside their discipline. They use maths, they make policy advice, but they ignore the linkage with other perspectives which are imcompatible to their mindsets. But env issues are complex and trans-disciplinary, exclusion of non-economic perspectives is just a ignorance of realities. Finally, policy may be misguided. And this partly contributes to the development of ecological economics, which takes philosophy, politics, economics, sociology...etc into account. If the mainstream economics is perfect, we don't need this.

In fact, in social science, there is a trend (actually a tradition) to move across disciplinary boundary. Sociology involves politics, econ is related to psycho, journalism to sociology and politics; geography almost covers all. And finally, all these are built upon philosophy. So, social scientists have no excuse to escape from other disciplines' inputs.

The limited scope of economics

A major problem of science is that scientists, including mainstream economists, limit their scope to their own disciplines only. They set up assumptions and build their arguments around these assumptions. They fail to see in the real world these assumptions are often not valid or the applicability is limited. Excluding ethical dimensions, for example, can make economic analysis 'manageable' and allows economists to claim themselves being 'scientific', and probably get a Nobel prize. But what happen if policymakers follow economists' advice without modifications? imposing social costs (Coarse theorem? hey, it fails when applying to intergenerational well-beings, and it would create political/ethical conflicts which is another types of social costs). So, when ecnomists say something as benefits > costs, they define the costs very narrowly. In the past it is ok, but now, the world has changed. Now people do not (or do not want to) define benefits and costs as a matter of utility only; collective well-beings are also included in their evaluation. Maximization of personal utility only is just an assumption that can no longer explain human behaviours very well. It is so obvious in psychology.

It also creates problems when economics is divorced from other disciplines like psychology. Human behaviours are not just determined by net utility gains, but right / wrong positions one holds. There is a range of motivations and the balance between utilitarian/deontological positions vary by individuals. Most importantly, it is misleading for economists to say everything is utility-based. It would be disastrous if policies are wholly based on such perspective. This is the way that our society operated in the past and present.

In fact, economics is not very objective indeed. For instance, as said, there are more human motivations than economists assume. Why do they make such assumptions? Some defend that non-utility motivations are just minority and can be ignored. Why should minority be ignored? When they do so, they are making a subjective judgement that it should be ignored. It 'should' be? No scientist is 100% objective. When economists and say social-conservationists evaluate the importance of an act, they simply weigh utilitarian and deontological positions to different degrees. They are doing the same thing but in different directions. Economics is just another school of philosophy, or as some ppl said, a kind of ethic (no 's'): utilitarian ethic. It is built upon an opposite position of deontology (utility vs. non-utility). It is not really a science from a theoretical point of view. (it does if being scientific means methodologically sophisticated, systemical & technical)

Mainstream economics is a closed intellectual system. Restricting to its own disciplinary boundary by claiming it as only a science is not really a strength but a source of those problems we face. Mainstream economists, it is time to open your eyes and listen to other disciplines. Pls do not take an incomplete understanding of reality as truth.

Chaning climate, changing value

Some researchers suggested that WTP reflects not only utility but also one's attitude. When paying for free trade coffee, which we know that it is no difference from those sold in supermarket, part of the WTP stems from our concerns to social injustice. It is an expression of our attitude towards the society. Likewise, boycotts against chained supermarket can be viewed as a kind of unwillingness to pay. It reflects our views about the role of state or the entreprise and probably a particular set of political beliefs (env problems as a result of free trade - liberalist ideology).

So, what is value? what is price? Obviously I pay for charitable flags not for utility reasons. Some defended that acqusition of moral satisfaction is also a kind of utility gains. Well...this is debetable. Can you use demand curve to predict moral satisfaction? Afriad not, evidence shows that it is scope-insensitive: price (in the form of stated WTP) sometimes remains unchanged, or change very little, as double amount of env goods are offered (so called 'embedding effect'). In fact, there are more evidence, like the refusal to make tradeoff (boycotts).

Some defended that those holding strong moral positions are minority. First, there are several categories of moral positions, some very strong (e.g. inviolable animal rights), some weak (change if livelihood is damaged). However, while the extreme one is minority, so does the strong utilitarian position (i.e. human first in any case). Most ppl are in the middle range - some moral, some utilitarian.

Economics grew in the age when ppl only concerned economic well-beings and therefore neoclassical theories worked well. In the past, human mainly looked at their own well-beings (who care black slaves?). Neoclassical theory was a perfect justification to the decision makers who strived to restore and expand their economies. But now, we add social and env justice in our agenda,we want to care about the socially deprived individuals and the future generations. In other words, we refuse to exclusively look at economic goals (except G.W. Bush and his followers). So the old schools simply fail to explain and inform the society which has changed a lot.
Modifying Clive's words: Climate is changing, preference is changing. Definition of value is also changing.

From science to philosophy (with Chinese)

Some thoughts about the development of the discipline I am engaging in. In short, the change in the focus is driven by a recognition that science is not the key to achieving SD although it does have a role to play. We have to look at value, the ultimate source of the problems.

When the science of sustainability emerged in 70s, it was more closely associated with physical scientific perspectives than social or philosophical ones. Earlier researchers in ecological economics (EE) took part in this endeavour by re-connecting ecology and economics and based their works on the biophysical reality. They assessed the sustain-ability of our economy by showing people the failure of the current economic model in accounting for the earth’s operation. They began with energy and material flow analysis, and used this to show the ridiculousness of neoclassical economics. In a series of academic debates, mainstream economic assumptions, like indefinite supply of natural resources and reversible process of resource use, were criticized as misrepresenting the real world in which the scale of economy is subject to biophysical constraints.

Those with a greater emphasis on social or philosophical sides form a new school of thought. They work on this newer perspective, which is still in its infancy, by addressing what value is in subjective terms rather than objective ones. They address the meaning of environmental value based on various non-science viewpoints, like psychology, political science and applied philosophy, which the earlier researchers in EE did not pay as much attention as they do. Some of the earlier researchers who have an ecology or economics background insisted on incorporating the 'truth' of the Earth into policymaking through adopting approaches like energy theory of value or ecological tariffs. It was (and still is) suggested that the best way to build a sustainable path is to find out the existing, objective ‘truth’ and show it to all people, they will then become aware of the problems and do something good. Big changes in policy and human behaviours are thus a viewed as a function of an objectivity. What we need to do is developing right science and getting rid of the wrong one, according to this view.
A key question is raised by the ‘new generation’ in EE: do human behaviours (and hence policy) really listen to objective facts? Is the relationship strong enough so that we can happily rest our future on science? Psychologists may say ‘No’. Lots of psychological researches have showed that it is people’s perception over the facts in question that determines human behaviours rather than the facts per se. For example, an American may be convinced by Al Gore’s “Inconvenient Truth” but is unwilling to pay any eco-tax because s/he hates this politician and the dirty political game he is playing.
The new wave starts with a more social scientific perspective. They seek to explore the potentials of understanding human perceptions (or the economics's wrong assumption of it) and behaviours which have no necessary linkage with an objective 'truth'. They research on the subjectivity of environmental value, which is recognized as variable, dynamic and multidimentional. There is no single ‘truth’, but changing contexts depending on spatial and temporal variations. Further, individuals are assumed to be capable of acting rationally and reacting ‘correctly’ to scientific evidence (neoclassical economists hold a view similar to this, i.e. defining utility-motivated actions as rational while excluding ethics). But this finds little support from social psychologists, like Icek Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviours which puts individual’s attitude, subjective norms and perceived behaviour control as the key determinants. Attitude may affect the extent to which people trust an institution and accept a particular piece of scientific ‘fact’ regarding global warming funded by, for instance, Exxon, a big oil company. Norms may also implicitly influence how individuals define what is ‘rational’, so fengshui (風水)is a rational and legitimate belief in Chinese societies and fengshui forest can be most effectively protected by cultural reasons rather than ecological ones. The new comers argue that wrong policy comes from a wrong value model, and wrong science is in turn more like an outcome of both these two, so one has make sure the value system is on the right track for informing science development. While science is necessary, it is subjective value that precludes as well as informs a big move.

生態經濟學是以可持續發展為目標的一門學問，其近30年的發展提示了對環境問題的另一個看法 (當然這裡包含了其他領域的貢獻)。轉變的重點是在於認識到客觀科學不是解決問題關鍵，雖然它仍的確扮演一個角色，我們要著眼於人類對『價值』的定義 - 問題的最終來源。 當可持續性這門學問出現在70年代，它主要從自然科學的角度出發多於社會或哲學的。在生態經濟學的範疇裡，早期旳研究人員嘗試建基於生物/物理的現實，來重新連接生態學和經濟學兩門有著很多共通點的學科。他們透過指出，由於過份簡化及脫離事實，現行經濟模式是無法反映地球的實際運作情況，來評估現行經濟模型的環境可持續性。他們從能量和物質流分析開始，揭示出新古典經濟學的可笑。在一系列的學術爭論中，新古典經濟學的假設，如天然資源的無限供應和資源使用過程的可回逆性等等，被批評為歪曲了現實世界裡經濟規模受生物物理限制這一事實。 當中有部份人比較強調社會或哲學觀點，遂形一個新的學派分支。他們做這方面的工作以較新的角度來看 – 不過目前仍然處於起步階段，他們強調環境價值是由主觀概念，而非客觀。他們以各種非科學的觀點，如心理學，政治學和應用哲學，來解釋和釐清環境價值的定義，而這些觀點在以前是被忽略了的。早期的生態經濟學者很多有生態學或經濟學背景，他們堅持把有關環境的科學'真理'放做政策制定的最主要考慮，並提出解決途徑例如能量價值理論或生態關稅。這曾被認為是（其實現在仍然是）最好的方法:要建設一個可持續發展的道路，就是要摸清現有的、客觀的科學'真理' (例如全球氣溫上升)，並將之展示世人，於是人們就會自然地為了解決這個問題而作出正面回應。政策和人類的行為大改變於是被看成建基於某種科學客觀性。根據這一觀點，我們需要做的是發展正確的科學和擺脫錯誤的那些。 生態經濟學的'新一代'提出了一個關鍵問題：人類行為（和政策）是否真的受眼前客觀事實所影響？這個關係是否真的那麼明顯，而使到我們能夠安心地把人類的將來寄託於科學？心理學家可能會說'不' 。大量的心理學研究表明，是人們對某個事實的主觀的價值態度決定著人的行為，而非客觀事實本身。舉例來說，一個美國人可能會信服戈爾的"Inconvenient Truth" ，但同時因為他/她不喜歡這位政治家和骯髒的政治遊戲，而不願意支付任何生態稅。
新一代生態經濟學家先從社會科學的角度來看。他們尋求對人類認知和行為的了解（或經濟學對此的錯誤假設），並認這些與客觀的'真理'沒有必然的聯繫。他們研究的環境價值的主觀性，及其可變性、互動性和多維性。這裡不存在單一的'真理'，而只有取決於空間和時間因素的不斷變化。此外，人類往往被假定為有能力作出理性行為和正確地對科學證據作出回應（新古典主義經濟學家持類似觀點，即認為純基於利益的行為是理性，而排除道德）。但這種認定對沒有得到社會心理學的實證支持，像Icek Ajzen的計劃行為理論 - 把個人的信念，主觀社會規範和自覺行為控制為決定人類行為因素。個人信念可能會影響到人們有多信任的某個制度或機構，並有多少接受某項科學證據 ，例如由埃克森公司贊助的關於全球變暖的科學研究 (誰會信石油公司提出的『證據』?)。社會規範也可暗地裡影響個人如何界定什麼是'合理' ，是故在中國人社會風水被認為是一種理性和合理的信仰，因此保護風水林最有效的方法是建基於文化方面，而多於生態科學的。新一代生態經濟學家認為錯誤的政策來自於一個錯誤的價值系統，是錯誤的科學的又是二者的結果，所以當前的任務是要確保價值系統沒有走歪，從而提示正面的科學發展。當然科學是重要的，但最終卻是主觀價值阻礙而又能夠推動大改變。

Environmental ethics

Some environmental philosophers and ecological economists considered the reductionish approach of neoclassical economics as an ethic by itself in constrast to deontological understanding of the nature of some people in the society. Values in economic sense is narrowly defined in an atomistic, individual-driven way. But the new wave of social-environmental movement is built on rights-based approach, based either on an environmental-consequentialist mentality or absolute rights of non-human and advocating collective values.


Now there is a trend towards deontological values as an ethical basis of sustainable development. To this end, Funtowicz & Ravetz (1993) suggested that we are in the age of 'post-normal' science. Provided that the environment is a public good,they suggested that for achieving environmental sustainability, we have to move from the past utilitarian ethics and atomistic understanding of the world characterising science (both physical science and neoclassical economics) to an open, delibreractive approach emcompassing norms, values and different ethical stances of human in a collective social context. It is because past utility-based policy tools are actually an inapproriate way to deal with the environment as a public good. A self-interested individual may be willing to pay for better quality of drinking water but not global warming mitigation. Decision-makers have to think about what ethical motivations people have when dealing with global environmental problems - a different ethics is needed comparing to the exclusive economic pursit in the past few centuries.

So, there is tendency of (re)constructing a new ethics, new value theory as the world is confronted global issues like enhanced greenhouse effect. This is different from the emphasis of using technical means (by assuming high scientifc certainty) or economic tools (still based on utility maximization) in the past few decades.

Is science the key to global warming?

After reading several papers on global warming and relationship of science and society written by Dr Sp ash, I think it is useful to elaborate the main points in a few paragraphs before I meet him in person.

For those who find difficulties in reading what follows, bear in mind one thing: global environmental problems are not just a matter of science; whether there is scientific evidence of global warming or not does not change the conclusion that the ways we understand and 'operates' the environment are problematic.

Scientific proof is not the key point because of the human's inadequate understandings of the nature. Since science is established on laboratory settings, scientific 'evidence' is based on many assumptions and confined to existing knowledge. It has some key differences from the live world we face which is a dynamic, always changing system, both in subjective and objective sense (i.e. both values and facts). Even though we claim ourselves able to find the scientific 'truth', it would be misleading to suggest that this can determine correct policy conclusions.

Whether global warming exists is always controversial, not only because of scientific uncertainties but more of vested interests. As far as sustainable development is concerned, science is not everything. Kuhnian science extended from laboratory, or normal science which is in constrast to post-normal science (see Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993), has missed humankind as an integral part of the natural world for centuries. Scientifically sound conclusions in natural science and economics literature manifest themselves ethically 'neutral'. But can we, or should we, achieve a fundamentally value-free sustainable path?

Another problem with science is the treatment to uncertainties. In natural science and economics literature there are professionally determined 'evidence' claiming that there is Problem A so that we need to do something for it, or the reverse.
Imagine you are playing puzzle game. If you cannot see how big the picture is, can you tell me precisely which pieces you are missing? No one knows, but we may still be able to make some ways to fix it. Given the numerous uncertainties, varieties and complexities of Earth's operations, can anyone PROVE that there is global warming? This applies to the reverse, can anyone DISPROVE that there is global warming?

Science can make figures precise, but it may be precisely wrong without anyone knowing this except the God.

A point I want to make is that: broadly speaking, every human activity can do harm to non-human entities, over time and space, so you never know what problems follow after solving Problem A. It is more important to develop the ways, or insitutions, through which we can find the appropriate and timely solutions whenever new problems arise, than to develop a single set of solutions to deal with a specific problem. The world is changing, so do the problems and hence solutions. It will not point to a hands-off approach even if global warming is PROVED inexistent.

A systemic bias in ecosystem valuation

After readings a few articles written by Dr Spash (who interviewed me last week) and some others, I get a couple of new thoughts on environmental valuation.

There is a systemic bias in traditional environmental valuation techniques, to whcih Dr Spash named as 'deontological bias'. When applying valuation techniques like Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), economists would usually classify zero bids or 'unrealistic' bids as protest bids and eliminate these from the average and aggreate WTP figures. But some protest-bidders might hold strong rights-based beliefs. They thought that any components of the nature have an inviolable right to exist and need to be protected whatever the costs. They were not irrational but simply did not believe that the monetary estimates could represent their unlimited 'values' attached to particular environmental products or goods. Under the current mechanisms this kind of responses is not counted. Consequently the WTP figures are biased to utilitarians who do have a 'value' in their minds.

The importance of such an utilitarian-deontological distinction lies on the ways 'values' are defined in current value system. Common economics beleifs suggest market prices represent the utility levels obtained by buying that good or service. By utility it does not actually imply whether that good or service exhibit certain actual 'functions' or not; it may refer to non-use preferences. Most economists do not reject this view. While prices represent an array of preferences of an individual, does it include deontological beliefs? Is it really presenting the whole picture?

Can prices, or valuation techniques like CVM, measure a 'price' I may impose on something to which I reject such a measuring practice? Put simply, I think my daughter or son is priceless, does it make sense if you ask me for a price? It is, however, still a problem if you deny the existence of an implicit value for that environmetnal good or services, given that, in philosophical sense, 'value' per se means the whole array of preferences, be it utilitarian or deonological. Exclusion of which is an ignorance of reality.

This draws many problems about how to incorporate these implicit beliefs into policy-making. The first one is, do we still need a value? I think the answer is 'yes', but we need to think seriously whether valuation should be treated as an end itself, or alternatively, a means to an end. Second, how can we precisely measure rights-based beliefs? Maybe by Deliberative Monetary Valuation (DMV) that Dr Spash is working on, probably including me as well if I am luckily accepted for the PhD studentship.

P.S. Now I understand why someone said every academic discipline, at the end, is a branch of philosophy. And that's why research doctoral degree is called 'Doctor of Philosophy' (PhD). It seems to me that sustainability is more like a philosophical quest.

Formation of environmental values

Values. What are values? Can be prices you pay in the market, can be your attitudes towards something. But how can we determine their relationship when there does not exist a market for that product?

Mainstream economists are more than familiar with the estimation of the values of non-marketed environmental goods. We got thousands of articles talking about the determination of values of different environmental goods; we got a long list of valuation techniques for us to make use of, too. Finally we got the numbers. But do we clearly understand how the 'numbers' are formed? Everyone in an introductory economics class can tell me the socioeconomics characteristics of the respondents (for Contingent Valuation Method) would matter.

But I am talking about the 'process'. Dr. CL Spaash, among others, suggested that when a small group of people could have a discussion before they stated the monetary values for certain environmental goods, the values would be different, comparing to individual interviews. This is a process that mimics the real delibrative process in a democratic society.

A large group of elderly and mid-age individuals living in the same public housing estate for more than 30 years may have different values too, because they have developed a strong sense of belongings to the built environment as well as the landscapes inside. An good example is trees, under which they roamed for no reason, they slept for a whole afternoon, they chated with each other. Their 30-year living in that estate is a process, a much longer process.

Contrast to neoclassical economic views, preferences can change along with temporal and spatial variations. Values are not only a reflection of individuals' rational behaviours, but are socially constructed - that means values are not a matter of one single person, but a group of people who are interacting with each other and with the environment as well.

I am preparing to capture the impacts of these variations on environmental values.

What's Ecological Economics?

Forget to do one thing that I should do in the first post - to explain what Ecological Economics means. Quote from Wiki:

Ecological economics is a transdisciplinary field of academic research that addresses the dynamic and spatial interdependence between human economies and natural ecosystems. Ecological economics brings together and connects different disciplines, within the natural and social sciences but especially between these broad areas.
As the name suggests, the field is comprised of researchers with a background in economics and ecology. An important motivation for the emergence of ecological economics has been criticism on the assumptions and approaches of traditional (mainstream) environmental and resource economics. Ecological economics presents a more pluralistic approach to the study of environmental problems and policy solutions, characterized by systems perspectives, adequate physical and biological contexts, and a focus on long-term environmental sustainability. Ecological economics can be regarded as a version of environmental science with much emphasis on social, political, economic and behavioral issues.

Ecological economics' intellectual ancestry may be traced in large part to political economy, a refinement of early economic theory that includes among its earlier researchers Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. Mill, in particular, by hypothesizing that the "stationary state" of an economy might be something that could be considered desirable, anticipated later insights of modern ecological economists, without having had their experience of the social and ecological costs of the dramatic post-World War II industrial expansion.

The objective of ecological economics (EE) is to ground economic thinking and practice in physical reality, especially in the laws of physics (particularly the laws of thermodynamics) and in knowledge of biological systems. It accepts as a goal the improvement of human wellbeing through economic development, and seeks to ensure achievement of this through planning for the sustainable development of ecosystems and societies. It distinguishes itself from neoclassical economics (NCE) primarily by its assertion that economics is a subfield of ecology, in that ecology deals with the energy and matter transactions of life and the Earth, and the human economy is by definition contained within this system. In contrast, NCE has historically assumed implicitly (and, more recently, explicitly) that the environment is a subset of the human economy. In this approach, if nature is valuable to our economies, that is because people will pay for its services such as clean air, clean water, encounters with wilderness, etc.

So, it is clear that EE is not a branch of economics but a hybrid of various pentinent disciplines. Urban ecological economics, the field I am working on, is a combination of economics, urban planning and human/physical geography as well. As strange as it is in HK, I sometimes feel lonely when I find no one to share except my supervisor. Well...perhaps, as he said, doing research is a lonely journey.

『貪念』是環境破壞的真正成因?

環境破壞的真正原因真的是人的貪念嗎?
除人類以外的各種生物無一不『貪』，牠們一樣用盡各方法去增加自己可以使用的資源，某種物種的堀起可能導致另一物種數量下降甚至絕種，前者掠奪了後者的資源無非也是出自一己私利罷，如果從後者的角度看這也可算是『不環保』。事實上從進化論的角度看，如果生物沒有半點『自私』之心，根本無可能延續下去，物競天擇適者生存，所謂『適者』就是能確保自己獲得足夠的資源來生活下去，所以所謂的『貪念』是物種得以延續並進化的基本條件。

人類『貪』，其他生物也『貪』，為什麼我們不指責其他生物也不環保呢?
其他生物跟人類的其中一個很重要的分別是牠們『貪』之餘也能夠確保資源的循環性，牠們處於一個緊密的生物鏈當中，一方面用各種方法獲取資源，另方面製造另一些資源供其他物種使用，消耗之餘亦對其他物種的生存帶來正面影響，但人類則長則將自己isolate係生態循環中，只有消耗，沒有『貢獻』
同埋仲有intensity嘅問題，人類人口可以看似毫無限制地上升，同時人均消耗又不斷上升，資源消耗量比其他生物多出很多，但其他生物卻不得不面對某些資源限制，例如牠們幾乎無法解決因數量上升而導致的資源短缺問題，相反，人類卻可以藉著科技來擺脫這些限制，然而這卻加深了生態系統的負荷。兩者智慧上的差距使到人類的『貪念』比其他生物更具破壞力。

生物的自私行為是其本性，水能覆舟亦能載舟，其本身可以是對環境有害亦可以有利，環保不環保只是取決於其影響而不在於主觀定義本身。

人口與環境

人口問題其實是環境問題的根源，18世紀末英國經濟學家馬爾薩斯(Thomas Malthus)提出人口的增長率往往高於資源的增長率，結果引致資源不足，繼而帶出疾病、戰爭、餓荒等等社會經濟問題，這些天災人禍使人口又會向下調整。
不過，自踏入廿世紀以來，科技的高速發展令人對這套被稱為馬爾薩斯主義的觀點產生質疑，因為現實告訴我們，人口上升並沒有帶來預的災難性影響。可是，這些反馬爾薩斯主義者忽略了一點，就是資源耗用的時間性。使用某一資源的影響不一定是即時性的，而可以是十年、五十年甚至一百年後才會顯現出來，環境資源就是一個典型的例子：一天之內砍光地球上所有樹木不會立刻導致人類滅亡，即使一天之內用盡了所以非再生能源人類活動也不會立刻終止。廿多年前經濟學家Julian Simon說只要human capital(e.g.人類的智慧)仍在，便可以不斷製造出各樣資源，包括能源，所以就算挖乾了所有油田也無礙，人類可以轉靠可再生能源，可以製造風力發電機、太陽能裝置等等，人類活動依然可以靠增加人口(即增加human capital)來生生不息延續下去...
但是Julian Simon支持人口無限增長的論調是站不住腳的，因為他完全漠視了所以human capital都需要用自然資源來製造、運作這一事實，沒有自然資源根本不可能有human capital，太陽能裝置也得耗用金屬!

人口增長至某一程度，就一定會對環境帶來沉重壓力，除非......

Preference construction for sustainability

The economic dominance of Hong Kong development history is necessarily conducive to economic individualism, reductionism which has significantly impeded the merits of its environmental policy. Without downplaying their roles in mitigating pollution, some environmental policies, like sewage charges and emission limits, are deterministic and do not see the construction of preference as a policy goal in search for a sustainable path. Consultation exercises, on the other hand, are meaningful because it is a kind of deliberative activities that were totally absent in the colonial years. However, did they make any difference to the environmental policymaking? I doubt this. What I want to point out is, one of the goals of sustainability policy is to facilitate formation and transformation of preferences. Preferences, or values, are ultimate cause of behaviours; ignorance of the ways they evolve will produce no qualitative change in the ecological economy.


The idea above is drawn from an academic paper I finished reading a few minutes ago. Below is an extract from that article, written by Niemeyer and Spash; the latter is a prestigious ecological economist who recently works in deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) to which I am very interested in.

“The treatment of individuals as ‘economically rational’ (that is, self-interested and aiming to maximise utility), is far removed from the individual as a member of a community who aims to achieve a collectively best outcome. Thus, economy theory tends to assume that preferences about collective environmental goods and services are predetermined and require no further explanation. Once humans are viewed as moral agents, their values, and consequently, preferences, can only be understood in historical, social, and ecological contexts (Siebenbuner, 2000). Preference construction means taking into account the formation of preferences and their change through campaign, media coverage, advertising, or survey processes.”

(Extracted from Niemeyer, S., & Spash, C. (2001). Environmental valuation analysis, public deliberation, and their pragmatic syntheses: a critical appraisal. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 19)